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Abstract
We consider the links between information and communications technologies (ICTs)
and the distribution of income, as mediated by problems of coordination and control
within organizations. In the large corporations of the mid-twentieth century, a highly
developed division of labor was coordinated and controlled with the aid of relatively
underdeveloped ICTs. This created a situation in which the options of top manage-
ment were constrained while the individual and collective power of lower paid workers
was enhanced. Only in the late twentieth century, when the microprocessor and re-
lated technologies transformed the information systems of organizations, did improve-
ments in the tools of coordination and control race ahead of the growing demands
of coordination and control. These technological changes have reduced the power of
lower-paid employees, increased that for higher-paid employees, and led to an increase
in income inequality. Thus, the more important aspects of new technology relate to
the power-bias, rather than the skill-bias, of technological change.
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1 Introduction
From 1940 to 2000, income inequality in the United States traces a sort of lop-sided U,
falling abruptly in the 1940s and then rising, slowly in the mid 1950s and 1960s, more
rapidly from the late 1970s onwards (Lindert, 2000; Kopczuk, Saez and Song, 2007). What
the high-income households lost in the 1940s was largely property income, while what they
gained from the late 1970s onwards has been wage and, to a lesser extent, entrepreneurial
income (Piketty and Saez, 2007). Evidence from a variety of sources suggests that a similar
"great compression" took place in other industrial capitalist economies in the 1940s, as did
the replacement of property with wage and entrepreneurial income (see, e.g., Moriguchi
and Saez, 2007; Piketty et al., 2006). However, in many countries, the compression of
the income distribution has not been reversed, or was reversed later and less dramatically
than in the US.
Many explanations have been o¤ered for parts of this great U turn, and a few ex-
planations have attempted to encompass all of it. Among economists, the hegemonic
explanation for increased income inequality from the 1970s onwards was, until recently,
skill-biased technological change (SBTC). Even by generous readings, however, SBTC
cannot account for the extreme rises in wage income for the top one percent, nor can it
account for the abruptness of the compression in the rst place.
A second class of explanations attributes the compression, and de-compression, to in-
stitutional changes. Many of these - changes in tax rates, social insurance, minimum wage
legislation, the legal framework of industrial relations, and the organizational reach of
trade unions - came just before or just after the second world war. Wartime mobilization
itself has often been seen as a spur to egalitarianism, both in attitudes and in institutions.
And, clearly, the US and other countries in which income inequality rose so quickly from
the late 1970s onwards saw, in that period, sharp reversals of some of the equalizing in-
stitutional changes of the great compression itself: the Reagan and Thatcher revolutions,
and similar waves of liberalization in the other Anglophone countries. The large contribu-
tion of institutional changes to the fall and rise of inequality is undeniable, and yet these
changes raise at least as many questions as they answer. War may, as a rule, be a social
leveler, but the leveling is not always cemented with durable institutional changes. Even
in the US, where the great compression was relatively short-lived, inequality continued
falling for nearly a decade after the war, and pre-war levels of inequality were not reached
again until the 1980s. Why did the leveling institutions last as long as they did, and why
did a great wave of liberalization, and rising inequality, sweep the English-speaking indus-
trial economies around 1980? And why did the 1940s also see a reduction in inequality
in neutral countries, such as Spain (Alvaredo and Saez, 2006), and Sweden (Roine and
Waldenstrom, 2006)?
Our argument in this paper is that changes in information and communications tech-
nologies (ICTs) used in workplaces contributed to the fall and rise in American inequality.
These same technologies tend to be the focus of the SBTC literature, but contrary to the
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SBTC hypothesis, we argue that the path from technology to distribution runs through
technologys e¤ects on agency costs, rather than skills. We accord a central role to institu-
tions, but we see the institutional changes in question as partly endogenous. Our analysis
owes a great deal to two distinct strands of literature. One of these is a literature on the
changing organization of production, both within and between rms, with an emphasis on
the information systems required for coordination and control (Chandler, 1977; Beniger,
1984; Yates, 1989). The other is the literature of agency - the formal study of the costs
of controlling individual and collective employee behavior when contracts are incomplete
(Alchian and Demsetz, 1972; Bowles, 1985; Gintis and Ishikawa, 1987).1
We argue that the compression of incomes in the 1940s was in part a response to
problems created by the expansion of managerial business in the preceding decades. The
leveling of incomes was a result of the limitations of the available information and com-
munications technologies for coordination and control of these new, large enterprises. In
ways that we detail below, the burdens of coordinating large, complex, and geographically
dispersed companies enhanced the bargaining power of those lower in the hierarchy, and
reduced that of top managers. From the 1970s onwards, advances in ICT improved co-
ordination and control, reducing the agency rents accruing to those lower in the corporate
hierarchies. The exibility that the new ICTs brought also created new rents for those at
the top of the hierarchies.
Following our terminology in Skott and Guy (2007a), we refer to changes in the relative
ability of di¤erent groups to extract rents as a result of changes in workplace technology
as power biased technological change (PBTC).
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 lays out the relationship
between information systems and agency in the operation of large organizations. Section 3
presents the argument for power-biased technological change in the mid-twentieth century,
and for the inversion of this power bias in the late twentieth century. Section 4 discusses
the implications of the technological changes for the power of managers. Section 5 uses
a small model to analyze the e¤ects of PBTC in a more formal setting. Section 6 briey
considers the relation between skill and power, and the relationship between the intra-rm
issues addressed elsewhere in this paper and institutional change is broached in Section 7.
Section 8 o¤ers a few concluding comments.
2 Communications technology and problems of coordina-
tion and control
Economic growth is associated with an increasing division of labor, for the familiar reasons
given by Adam Smith (1776), and any division of labor creates a need to coordinate the
various specialized workers involved. For this reason, Machlup (1962) tells us, economic
1 In its emphasis on institutions and relative power, our analysis has a¢ nities with a number of other
contributions, incl. Freeman (1996), Gordon (1996), Howell and Wieler (1998), Levy and Temin (2007).
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growth comes with a growing share of work being devoted to information tasks - the
overhead costs, if you will, of the division of labor. Moreover, as the division of labor grows,
the economys information requirements change qualitatively as well as quantitatively: we
do not simply have more mercantile accounts in the manner of 15th century Venice, but
di¤erent kinds of accounts - cost accounting, capital accounting, and complex nancial
instruments.
In the late nineteenth century, as a result of growing markets and new production
technologies, there were gains to be had from creating large companies. Within a large
company, some subset of the increasingly elaborate division of labor was carried out in a
deliberately coordinated way - Chandlers (1977) visible hand.
There are important di¤erences between visible and invisible hand coordination, but
both hands rely on the reduction of the unstructured knowledge held by many di¤erent
people to common and communicable forms that we call information. Hayeks (1945)
information-theoretic reading of markets is instructive here: he maintains that the mar-
kets e¢ ciency advantage over the central plan lies in its ability to distill vast amounts
of local knowledge (what Polanyi (1962) calls tacit knowledge) into a single price vector.
Yet, similar, if less extreme, reductions in the dimensionality of information take place
within planned systems, including rms: the creation of standard categories and meas-
ures, whether for products, people, or processes, necessarily omits or distorts some features
that might be salient, but this is a cost of establishing communication between o¢ ces in
an organization, and in so doing facilitating coordination and control. Weber (1968) called
such a reduction in the dimensionality of information "rationalization". Beniger (1986),
describing the same phenomenon in the language of computer science, regards an organ-
izations rules, procedures and annual budgets as ways of "pre-processing" information:
xed rules economize on information processing. 2
Rationalization is a feature of the bureaucratic - and, to Weber, rational - organiza-
tion, which we associate today with inexibility. Inexibility can reduce the need for the
communication and processing of information. Consider the pioneering of modern man-
agement by early railroads: trains were unable to communicate with one another, and
collisions were prevented by the adoption of roles and rules. In the 1850s, a train on the
Boston and Worcester Railway could not move without the authorization of the conductor
- an employee who directed this costly and dangerous collection of equipment by virtue
of o¢ ce, which is to say a bureaucrat. The conductor was, in turn, bound by a strict
set of rules: a westbound train was to stop in the station at Framingham, and could not
proceed until an eastbound train had arrived on the opposite track (Chandler, 1977, p.
96). Doubtless such a system caused many ine¢ ciencies, as a delay to one train meant a
delay to the other, but the predictability created by such rules had clear benets. Two
2Rationalization and pre-processing are also evident in the routines emphasized by Simon (1957) in his
discussion of bounded rationality. Bounded rationality is usually explained with reference to the cognitive
limits of individuals. Simon uses the concept, however, to explain behavior within organizations. In this
light, it is worth noting that while routine- or rule-based behavior in organizations can reect inherent
human cognitive limitations, it can also reect technological limits to communication and computation.
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aspects of this are interesting to us. One is that rule-based predictability - and inexibility
- substituted for communication. The other is the contrast between that early railway,
and transport systems both before and after. Systems before - canal boats, wagons, ships
at sea and so on - required less coordination than rail systems, and the individuals in
charge of the di¤erent vessels were not bound by such detailed rules or procedures. Rail
systems today retain very tight rules and procedures - leaving, if anything, less room for
judgement by a trains conductor - but improved ICTs (scheduling and signalling systems)
allow far greater exibility in the disposition of trains.
To draw a more general lesson from this example, consider the development of other
large businesses in the wake of the railway. Geographically dispersed activities were co-
ordinated with the aid rst of the telegraph and later with voice telephony. Both are
high-speed communications technologies, but ones which su¤er from very low bandwidths
and no direct connection with any information storage or processing system. For the
telegraph to be of use in discussing, say, the purchase of some materials or merchandise,
any relevant technical specications had to be already known between the parties. This
constraint was relaxed somewhat with the telephone - a fact often credited with further-
ing the spatial separation of operations within companies in the early twentieth century
- but when compared with the torrent of technical specications and market information
that can pour down a strand of cable today, the world of the telephone looks much like
that of the telegraph. Such communications systems did not lend themselves to real-time
processing, and this contributed to a heavy reliance on pre-processing.
It is plain from the historical record that, from the start, large companies were con-
strained by their technologies of coordination and control. Beniger (1986) describes what
he calls a "crisis of control" in the mid-19th century; response to this crisis stimulated
the development and application of new ICTs. Yates (1989) aptly describes this period
as one in which "control through communication" developed. Cortada (1993) chronicles
the development of mechanical and electro-mechanical tabulating machines, the primitive
number-crunching ancestors of the computer.
E¤ective coordination and control is a moving target: ICTs and their applications
improve, but the division of labor becomes more elaborate. Jonscher (1994) provides
evidence, however, that in the 1970s and 1980s, there was a qualitative advance in the
pursuit of improved coordination and control. In that period, the microprocessor and
related technologies made it possible to integrate information systems with systems of
production and of service delivery. For Jonscher, this presents itself as a problem of data
classication: through 1970, he is condent in classifying occupations as information work
and non-information work; from 1980, he nds this impossible. For us, the breakdown of
these categories reects a breakthrough in coordination and control.
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3 Coordination, control, and the power of workers
The scale of planned activity together with the limits of ICTs in mid-twentieth century
organizations worked to compress the distribution of income by empowering workers, and
dis-empowering managers.
We begin with the workers, and proceed later to the managers. The limitations of ICTs
a¤ect the power of workers in three di¤erent ways: rst, through the managersability
to monitor the actions of workers; second, because the inexibility of the system - the
heavy reliance on pre-processing - reects the fact that managers lack information about
the conditions (or, in the language sometimes used in formal models of uncertainty, the
state of nature) in which the workersactions take place; and, third, because many of the
pre-electronic information ows within organizations were restricted to a small number of
paths, literally dened by the paths of pieces of paper, which were vulnerable to hold-up
by employees along the way.
Consider, for example, the case of retail clerks. The invention of the cash register in
the 1870s provided a key control technology in retailing: it provided a way of ensuring
that the money collected from customers matched the money a clerk handed over to her
or his employer at the end of the day. It was little help in ghting collusion between
clerks and customers (i.e., deliberate undercharging), and was only a crude instrument
for measuring the work pace or productivity of the clerk. Over the ensuing decades
cash registers proliferated, improved mechanically, were replaced by electro-mechanical
versions, and then improved still further, but their functions remained the same. Such
information as was collected from cash registers had to be summarized, manually, for each
store in a multi-store company, and then entered, again manually, into the companys
system of accounts. Not until the late 1970s, with bar codes and networked computing,
was there a fundamental change in what the cash register did. With those changes,
the cash register suddenly provided a substantial barrier to clerk-customer collusion, and
provided ne monitoring of each individual clerks productivity throughout the day. The
same automatic data collection capabilities allow managers to monitor patterns of business
throughout the day - that is, to know the state of nature in which the workers are acting.
All of this information is fed to, and processed automatically by, a computer system which
can make results available to managers at many levels of the organization. And, of course,
such point-of-sale systems are just part of larger management information system which
allows monitoring of employees and operations up and down the supply chain.
We see similar cases in nancial services, for instance with the movement of customer
service from desks in local bank branches to call centers.
These changes a¤ect the power workers have in their relations with their employers.
Power, as we use the term, means one partys ability to a¤ect outcomes that matter for
another. The power a worker has over an employer is a function both of the sensitivity of
employer outcomes to the workers actions - is the worker able to a¤ect a large operation
or a costly piece of equipment, or is her work independent and without much capital? -
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and of the employers ability to constrain the workers actions through monitoring and
intervention.
High costs of monitoring individual workers, or the employers ignorance of the state
of nature in which they operate leads, ceteris paribus, to higher wages. Poor information
systems reduce the match between contractible proxies for a workers e¤ort or output,
and the e¤ort or output itself; the power of workers is enhanced and the level of e¢ ciency
wages tends to increase. This holds whether the latter is understood as taking place in
a gift exchange (Akerlof 1982); or in an adversarial relationship in which performance is
enforced through a combination of employment rents, and a threat of dismissal following
the principals subjective evaluation of the agents performance (Bowles 1985; Gintis and
Ishikawa 1987; Shapiro and Stiglitz 1984). We examine this point in detail with the model
and simulation presented below.
The employers imprecise knowledge of the state of nature also creates a functional role
for labor unions. The inexible and rule-bound rm often requires that low-level employees
go beyond what their instructions require; bureaucratic organizations have been brought
to a standstill by their employees "working to rule". If doing a good job requires working
beyond - and perhaps even in violation of - the rules, or suggesting changes to the rules,
employees may expose themselves to arbitrary retaliation from supervisors simply by doing
a good job. Part of the voice function of the union is to ensure fair treatment in such
circumstances. Freeman and Medo¤ (1984) gave this as a reason why unionized companies
in the United States enjoy higher productivity than non-unionized ones. 3
Let us turn, nally, to the question of the ow of information. Management of the ow
of materials is at the center of Chandlers analysis of the large corporation, and its ability
to achieve economies of speed. The vulnerability of mid-twentieth century production
systems to interruptions of this ow is a well-understood factor in industrial relations: by
sitting down in a few factories in 1937, workers at General Motors were able to bring a
large part of the North American manufacturing operations of this company - and many of
its suppliers - to a halt. The vulnerability of such production systems is often understood
as a result of the inexible, single purpose nature of the capital stock (Piore and Sabel,
1984). Yet economizing on information processing was also a factor in the design of these
systems: the single path ow of goods and xed purpose machines also formed part of
a control system which made it possible to monitor the pace of work without benet
of elaborate information systems; this is the distinction Edwards (1979) makes between
3Fairris (1997) argues that it was the productivity benets of voice that led to an organized movement
among American employers, during the rst World War, to establish company-sponsored employee asso-
ciations; many of these associations were later supplanted by unions, which took over the voice function
and combined it with such functions as wage bargaining. More recent evidence comes from Black and
Lynch (2001), who study the e¤ects of high performance work practices on productivity in American man-
ufacturing. High performance work practices involve problem-solving and decision-making by individual
workers and by teams, at some cost to central control. Black and Lynchs nding is that such practices
bring productivity benets only when unions are present; they attribute this to union voice, consistent
with the analysis here.
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mechanical and bureaucratic control.
Like the single-path ow of materials in mass production, the vertical integration
characteristic of mid-twentieth century has an information systems element. The same ICT
limitations which make the internal plans of a company rigid and imprecise also limit what
is measurable for the purposes of inter-rm contracts. We should expect this to further
improve workers collective bargaining power, and to compresses earnings di¤erentials
between workers. We expect enhanced bargaining power because each act of vertical
integration - whether for the supply of high tech parts, or taking catering and cleaning
in-house, creates some degree of lock-in that would not be present if the service were
purchased on a competitive market.4 Since the late 1970s, however, Chandlerian economies
of speed have been routinely realized in coordinated multi-rm networks. In this and
other respects, the greater exibility of information ows permits greater exibility of
organizational conguration; the world in which information can be directed down any
number of paths at will is also a world in which the supply paths of goods and services
can be shifted with relative ease, thus weakening workersbargaining power.
Networked productions most noticeable manifestation is cross-border, and cross-ocean,
outsourcing. Within industrial countries, it seems clear both empirically and by standard
Stolper-Samuelson reasoning, that this increases inequality, although the size of this e¤ect
is disputed (see, e.g., Wood, 1994; Leamer, 1996). Although much of this analysis is framed
with reference to trade in general, the point here is that the more rapidly developing
areas of trade - what economists call intra-industry trade - is occurring within planned
manufacturing, procurement and distribution chains over distance (Gere¢ 1999; Gere¢ ,
Humphrey, and Sturgeon 2005).
4 The power of managers
Organizational inexibility empowers workers, and for the same reasons it dis-empowers
managers. We can see this if we view the managers employment relationship as we viewed
the employment relationship of the worker, absent questions of collective action. The logic
of agency models, including the e¢ ciency wage model we use below, is that wages are an
increasing function of the sensitivity of the employers outcomes to the managers e¤ort.
(In this we assume that there is a principal to set the managers wage and to threaten
sanctions for non-performance.) If the nature of organizational inexibility is that few
changes get made or attempted, and that competitors who are similarly inexible demand
less in the way of rapid response, the marginal product of the managers e¤ort should be
less, and remuneration should be less.
With a exible organization in an environment of other exible organizations, managers
4Vertical integration should also be expected to compress overall di¤erentials among workers simply
because it is known that organizations compress income di¤erentials internally, relative to the market; the
reasons for this are contested, but the empirics are clear (Frank 1985; OShaughnessy, Levine, and Cappelli
2001).
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have more consequential choices to make. Moreover, the ICTs which facilitate the exib-
ility, in part by enhancing the monitoring of workers and of the states of nature in which
workers make decisions, can do little to monitor the more complex and non-comparable
actions and options of executives.
For these reasons, the enhanced exibility of organizations can help to explain the
astonishing secular increase in executive pay in the US, Britain, and some other countries,
over the past thirty years. Others have attributed this increase - and the higher levels
of executive pay in the liberal market economies - to nancialization (OSullivan, 2001).
Financialization in this context refers to the adoption of a normative standard of maxim-
izing shareholder wealth as the proper objective for all rms and to the spread of hostile
takeovers and leveraged / private equity buyouts as means of enforcing nancial discipline
on managers. Explanations for nancialization include the growth of pension funds and
other institutional investors, providing a new source of monitoring for corporations in the
liberal market economies, and an ideological or cultural change wrought in the prot and
productivity slump of the 1970s. While both of these explanations have merit, we nd a
third (non-exclusive) explanation emerging from our analysis: namely, that organizational
modularity makes many di¤erent pieces of any large organization potentially marketable,
and for that reason makes the top executives job into one of managing an investment port-
folio of business units. A menu of such investment decisions is another form of executive
empowerment, and should lead to higher pay.
Whatever the cause of nancialization, the ongoing market for companies and parts
of companies creates similar agency rents for lawyers, investment bankers, and others
involved in these deals. Together with the rise in the pay of corporate executives, this
helps explain the extraordinary rise of the incomes - and, specically, the wage incomes -
of the top one per cent since 1982.
5 Modelling PBTC
An e¢ ciency wage model provides a framework for examining some of the issues of co-
ordination and control that are the focus of this paper.5 Consider an economy with three
inputs, capital (K) and two types of labor (NL and NH), and let the production be given
by
Y = F (eLNL; eHNH ;K)
where ei denotes the e¤ort of workers of type i. Using standard assumptions, type-i
workers decide their e¤ort by maximizing an objective function
V i = pi(ei)[wi   v(ei)  hi( wi; b; ui)]
5This section draws on, and extends, material from Skott and Guy (2007a).
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where wi;ui and b denote the average wage, the unemployment rate and the rate of unem-
ployment benets.6
The function v(ei) describes the disutility associated with e¤ort. In order to focus
more clearly on the e¤ects of changes in relative power, we assume symmetry between the
two groups of workers with respect to the v function, and in the calculations below we
use the specication; 7
v(ei) = e

i ;  > 1 (1)
The function pi(ei) captures the e¤ect of e¤ort on the expected remaining duration of
the job. An increase in e¤ort reduces the risk of being red (that is, pi0 > 0), and we use
a constant-elasticity specication,
pi0ei
pi
= i (2)
This specication can be seen as a log-linear approximation of the pi function around
the equilibrium solution for ei. The parameter i; which describes how well workers of
group i can be monitored, is an inverse indicator of power. A high value of i implies
that workers are closely monitored, the ring risk is very sensitive to variations in e¤ort,
and workers have little power; small values of i indicate that workers have high degrees
of discretion in the sense that variations in their e¤ort is likely to go undetected.
The function hi( wi; b; ui); nally, represents the expected utility in case of job loss.
The partial derivatives satisfy hiw > 0; h
i
b > 0 and h
i
u < 0 under all standard assumptions.
We use the specication associated with the intertemporal interpretation of the workers
maximization problem in Skott and Guy (2007a):
hi =
(r + )ui
rui + 
b+
(1  ui)
rui + 
( wi   v(ei)) (3)
where ei is the optimal e¤ort associated with the wage wi. The parameters r and  are
the discount rate and the rate of job separations, respectively, and assuming symmetry in
all respects other than power, both groups of workers have the same discount rate and the
same average rate of separations.8 Intuitively, the fallback position is a weighted average
of the utility when unemployed (b) and in an alternative job ( wi   v(ei)): The weights
depend on ui since (in a steady state) the unemployment rate is equal to the proportion
of time one can expect to be unemployed; if there is no discounting (r = 0) the weights
are simply ui and 1   ui; but when r > 0; unemployment (the initial state in case of job
loss) is weighted more heavily.
6A simple intertemporal optimization model reduces to a special case of the maximization problem
(Skott and Guy, 2007a).
7The parameter restriction  > 1 is needed since otherwise the rms unit cost would decrease mono-
tonically as wages increase.
8Di¤erences in the elasticities of the p  function do not imply that the two groups cannot have the
same average ring rates in equilibrium (see Skott and Guy (2007a) for details).
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The rst order condition for the workers maximization problem can be written
 piv0 + (wi   v   hi)pi0 = 0
and, using the functional forms for v and p in equations (1)-(2), this condition implies
that
ei = [
i
i + 
(wi   hi)]1= (4)
Wage and employment are set by the rm. Looking at the wage rst, the standard
Solow condition implies that
eiwwi
ei
= 1
and, using (4), we get
wi =

   1hi (5)
ei =

i
i + 
1
   1hi
1=
(6)
The demand for labor is determined by the rst-order conditions
wi = FNi(eLNL; eHNH ;K)
and the specication of the production function is critical for the implications of the model.
It is generally accepted that the elasticity of substitution between capital and labor is well
below unity (see Klump et al. 2007 for a recent study), but we know of no attempts to
examine the elasticity of substitution between groups with di¤erent workplace power.
As argued in section six below, power and skill may be correlated, and the labor-
labor elasticity for di¤erent skills is sometimes taken to be above unity. The evidence,
however, is weak. Katz and Murphy (1992) estimate an elasticity of 1.41 between high-
and low-skill workers (college and above vs high-school or less) but also point out that
they are "somewhat skeptical of estimates of  recovered from 25 nonindependent time
series observations", and a range of elasticities - including an estimate of 0.5 - is consistent
with the data in their study. Another recent study, Card et al. (1999), obtains very low
estimates (all at or below 0.5), and the survey of earlier work in Hamermesh (1993) does
not present a clear picture. These studies, in any case, focus on skill rather than power,
and power, unlike skill, is a job attribute. For present purposes it is therefore the elasticity
of substitution between jobs that matters, and the presence of mismatch in the job market
may generate a spurious impression of substitutability: even if there were to be perfect
complementarity between di¤erent jobs, the presence of mismatch - some high-skill workers
having low-skill jobs - could give the appearance of substitutability.9 Thus, we suspect the
9Let
Y = minfH;Lg
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empirically interesting case to be one in which the elasticity of substitution is well below
unity, but a nested CES production function allows us to consider several cases,
Y = Af2
3
([
1
2
(eLNL)
 1 +
1
2
(eHNH)
 1 ] 1=1) 2 +
1
3
K 2g 1=2
With this production function, the labor demand equations can be written
wi =
A
3
e
 1
i N
 1 1
i [
1
2
(eLNL)
 1 +
1
2
(eHNH)
 1 ](2 1)=2
f2
3
([
1
2
(eLNL)
 1 +
1
2
(eHNH)
 1 ] 1=1) 2 +
1
3
K 2g (1+2)=2 (7)
To close the model, we impose the equilibrium condition that wi = wi; and introduce
symmetric and inelastic labor supplies. Normalizing these supplies at unity, we have
ui = 1 Ni (8)
The solutions for wage rates, unemployment rates, work intensities (e¤ort levels), and
protability can be derived using (3) and (5)-(8), and we are in a position to examine the
e¤ects of PBTC or, in terms of the model, changes in the parameters L and / or H . If
we include top-management with prot recipients, then the stylized picture suggested by
our argument in sections 2-3 is one with a signicant rise in L over the last 30 years and
more modest changes or rough constancy of H :
The variations in L in Table 1 are within (what we consider) the plausible range,
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and we use a discount rate of r = 0:05 and a rate of separations of  = 0:2 (implying
where H;L are the numbers of high and low skill jobs that are lled. Assuming that some low-skill jobs
are lled by high-skill workers and / or some high-skill jobs by low skill workers, we have
H = NHH +NLH
L = NHL +NLL
where NHH and NHL are high-skill workers in high- and low-skill jobs, respectively, and NLL and NLH
are low-skill workers in low- and high-skill jobs. Prot maximizing rms do not employ idle workers, and
it follows that (NHH +NLH) = NHL +NLL and Y = (NHH +NLH): Hence,
( + 1)(NHH +NLH) = NHH +NLH +NHL +NLL
and
Y = (NHH +NLH) =

 + 1
(NHH +NLH +NHL +NLL)
=

 + 1
(NH +NL)
where NH and NL denote the employment of high and low skill workers, respectively.
A more complete model could include mismatch, along the lines of Skott (2006), as well as changes in
power. This, however, would complicate the analysis signicantly.
10The intertemporal interpretation of the workers maximization problem implies that p = 1=(r+ ) and
hence that p0e=p =   e
r+
d
de
=   
r+
d log 
d log e
where  is the rate of job separations. Job separations happen
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that just over 18% of workers will lose, or choose to leave, their jobs within one period).
The parameter  in the utility function must be greater then one (cf above), and the
qualitative results appear to be insensitive to the precise value. The table uses  = 5.
The rate of unemployment benets (b = 0:008), the capital stock (K = 0:1), and the
productivity parameter (A = 0:5) have been chosen to get employment rates of about
0:75, a replacement rate of about 1=3, and a capital-output ratio of about 2. With respect
to the production function and the elasticities of substitution, nally, the table assumes
that the capital-labor elasticity is 2 = 0:5 while three di¤erent values of the labor-labor
elasticity 1 are considered; a benchmark value of 1 = 0:5; a high substitutability case
with 1 = 1:5 and a low substitutability case with 1 = 0:2.
Table 1: E¤ects of a decline in the power of L  workers
on e¤ort, wage, unemployment, and prots
1a: Benchmark case, 1 = 2 = 0:5
L eL wL uL eH wH uH 
0:1 0:156 23:4 0:255 0:156 23:4 0:255 20:2
0:4 0:200 21:7 0:256 0:159 26:2 0:241 24:0
0:8 0:224 20:6 0:251 0:161 27:5 0:236 25:9
1b: Strong labor-labor complementarity, 1 = 0:2; 2 = 0:5
L eL wL uL eH wH uH 
0:1 0:156 23:4 0:255 0:156 23:4 0:255 20:2
0:4 0:195 19:1 0:280 0:162 28:8 0:231 23:6
0:8 0:216 17:0 0:294 0:165 31:2 0:224 24:9
1c: Strong labor-labor substitutability, 1 = 1:5; 2 = 0:5
L eL wL uL eH wH uH 
0:1 0:156 23:4 0:255 0:156 23:4 0:255 20:2
0:4 0:206 24:9 0:237 0:155 23:1 0:257 24:4
0:8 0:234 25:3 0:222 0:555 22:8 0:259 26:7
When there is labor-labor complementarity (the benchmark case with 1 = 0:5 and
the strong complementarity case with 1 = 0:2) workers with low power will be relatively
low-paid. An increase in L from L = 0:4 to L = 0:8 generates a decline in the abso-
lute and relative wage of L workers, and their work intensity increases (both absolutely
and relative to that of H workers); their relative employment declines and under strong
complementarity, absolute employment declines too. Thus, the simultaneous increase in
for many reasons (including voluntary quits and plant closures), and it seems unlikely that   d log 
d log e
should
exceed unity (this statement is meaningful since the chosen scale for e¤ort implies that the elasticity of
output with respect to e is the same as the elasticity with respect to N). It follows that  will be less than
one.
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the relative wage and the relative employment of high-skill workers does not require an
explanation in terms of SBTC. The table demonstrates that changes in power relation-
ships (the PBTC hypothesis) can explain these observations too. The increase in work
intensity, moreover, is in line with ndings of increased e¤ort in the UK and other indus-
trial economies during the 1980s and 1990s (Green 2004); the standard SBTC approach
sheds little light on these ndings. Note nally that total prots () and the prot share
(=( + (1  uL)wL + (1  uH)wH)) increase. In fact, in the benchmark case the propor-
tional increase is higher for prots than for wH , and the model can generate an explosion
in managerial pay even if it is assumed that the share of top management in net prots is
unchanged.
PBTC also produces an increase in wage inequality and increased prots in the case
with good labor-labor substitutability (1 = 1:5). The di¤erence is that in this case low-
power workers are high-paid, and to explain the observed increase in inequality over the
last 30-40 years one would have to argue that new ICT has reduced the power of highly
paid workers. This is implausible, and the empirical relevance of the model therefore
hinges on the assumption of complementarity between high- and low-power jobs.
The model clearly has many limitations. One of them is that it is limited to changes
in monitoring, which is just one avenue by which ICTs can a¤ect the workplace power
of employees; another that it deals only with individual e¤ort choices and wage bargains,
abstracting from any form of collective action. Thus, while the model may provide an
acceptable approximation of current wage setting in the US, UK, and other liberal market
economies (using the term in the sense employed by Hall and Soskice (2001)), it is less
appropriate for countries in which wage bargains are more likely to be collective.11
6 Skill bias?
In our discussion thus far we have focussed entirely on PBTC: a causal account running
from ICT to coordination and control, from coordination and control to the relative power
of di¤erent classes of employee, and from the distribution of power to the distribution of
earnings. A more widely held theory connects new technology with the earnings distribu-
tion through the market for skills.12
In formal models of earnings determination, the distinction between skill and power
11Unions inuence working conditions as well as wages. There is evidence that the presence of strong
unions reduces the impact of the cost of job loss on e¤ort (Green and McIntosh, 1998), and among European
countries there is a correlation between loss of union power and the rate of work intensication (Green
and McIntosh, 2001).
12The source of the bias - SBTC or PBTC - can have important implications for the welfare analysis
of technological change. Skill biases may produce both winners and losers, but there is a presumption
of net gains in the sense that under SBTC the gains of the winners would be su¢ cient, in principle, to
compensate the losers. There is no basis for this presumption in the case of power bias. A new technique
can be protable and may be adopted even if it is less e¢ cient than existing techniques (Skott and Guy
2007b; an earlier Marx-inspired literature includes Bowles (1989) and Green (1988)).
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seems clear: for skill, we have straightforward models of supply and demand equilibrium
in the market for human capital; for power, we have a variety of principal-agent models.
Yet the two are often been conated. Yet, while agency reasoning is widely used to explain
cross sectional di¤erences in earnings, it is seldom employed to explain changes in those
di¤erences over time. In most of the vast literature on skill, earnings, and technology,
power is either conated with skill, or ignored completely.
The habit of conation owes something to Braverman (1974), who does not conate
skill and power but does make them part of the same cause and e¤ect relationship: he
depicts de-skilling as a process driven by the employers objective of dis-empowering em-
ployees, with the aim of paying them less. Yet de-skilled employees can became powerful,
as the history of industrial unions testies; and skilled employees are not necessarily power-
ful, as the experience of countless cooks, musicians, garment makers and horticulturalists
shows. Power on the job is correlated with skill other things equal, when the employer
has a choice, more consequential discretion will be given to employees who know well what
they are doing, than to those who do not but it is not the same as skill, and factors
other than skill are involved in the determination of power.
The practice of either ignoring power or conating it with skill may owe simply to dis-
cretion being the better part of valor: trying to distinguish power and skill using available
data is almost never straightforward. Measurements of either property are at best incom-
plete, and are more often indirect. Sometimes the proxies used are equally well proxies for
skill and power. After a number of studies proxying skill with the use of a computer at
work had found that ICT-related skills led to higher pay (see Autor, Katz, and Krueger
1998, and references therein), DiNardo and Pischke (1997) found that German workers
received similar pay premiums for using computers and for using pencils; they also got
paid more for sitting rather than standing. DiNardo and Pischke do not leave us believ-
ing that we know what causes pay di¤erentials, but the fortuitous inclusion of pencils
alongside computers in their data does tell us something of the limits of our knowledge.
Or consider the evidence presented by Entorf and Kramarz (1997). Using longitudinal
data on individual earnings, technology and the amount of discretion a¤orded employees
in a broad sample of French companies, they nd an earnings premium for the use of
new technology, but only if the job allows signicant discretion. This is consistent with a
power interpretation, but we lack direct information on skill di¤erences. Similarly, many
studies of the e¤ect of ICTs on the labor process in growing parts of the service sector,
such as retailing, banking, telecommunications and customer service call centers provide
evidence that a widening of workplace power di¤erences following the adoption of ICTs
is quite common, if by no means universal. Signicant populations of lower-paid workers
face increased monitoring, more precise task specication, and reduced opportunity for
promotion, while managers face more consequential choices as a result of increased organ-
izational exibility. To the extent these studies deal with skill, however, skill di¤erentials
appear to be widening, too, so again the results are suggestive, but not decisive (Grim-
shaw et al. 2002; Grimshaw et al. 2001; Miozzo and Ramirez 2003; Batt 2001; Sewell
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1998; Hunter and Lafkas 2003). Card and DiNardo (2002) have argued that SBTC cannot
explain why US earnings inequality did not continue to rise in the 1990s, in the face of
continued adoption of new technologies; yet this can pose problems for PBTC, as well.
What we argue here is that SBTC falls down most clearly in its inability to provide a
convincing story of endogenous institutional change. This is a major problem for Goldin
and Katz (1998), for example, when they attribute the fact of the great compression in
the US to the rapid spread of high school education (a source of skill), but its suddenness
to other institutional changes which they must treat as exogenous. Similarly, when the
decompression speeds up in the late 1970s, it is helped along by a series of institutional
changes. Why should institutional changes, in both cases, accelerate the market trend?
7 Institutions
In the discussion above, we considered ways in which technologies of coordination and
control a¤ect the bargaining power of individual workers and managers, and of groups of
workers, at the level of the rm. What of the institutional environment in which the rm
and its employees bargain?
There is little question that institutional changes played major roles in both the reduc-
tion of inequality in the 1940s, and its rise since the late 1970s. Many of these institutional
changes can be viewed as complementary to the within-rm changes in bargaining power
we have described. In the US, for instance, federal legislation in the late 1930s strengthened
labor unions, extensions of social insurance improved the bargaining fall-back of work-
ers, and regulation restricted competition in many industries. The same can be said for
workplace health and safety, minimum wage, and statutory overtime pay. Later, in the
de-compression period, the enforcement of federal labor relations law weakened, industries
were de-regulated, and the real value of the federal minimum wage was allowed to fall.
DiNardo et al (1996) nd that de-unionization and the falling real value of the minimum
wage account for a substantial share of the rise in US wage inequality between 1979 and
1988.13
In many countries of course, the great compression of the 1940s was not matched by a
de-compression in the late 20th century. Recent studies of this question have been framed
in a comparative capitalisms framework which distinguishes between "liberal" market
economies (LMEs) and other, more or less "coordinated" market economies (CMEs). The
former coincide almost exactly with the English-speaking industrial economies, while the
various shades of the latter are found in continental Europe and East Asia. Mann and
13An insitutional explanation raises questions concerning the simultaneous increase in the relative wages
and employment of highly paid (high-skill, high-power) workers. This simultaneous change could be
accommodated by the PBTC model in section 5. It can also, however, be accounted for, in models with
neither skill nor power biases. If the labor market is characterized by overeducation- that is, a mismatch
with many high-skill workers accepting jobs for which their skills are not needed - an increase in the relative
wage of high-skill jobs need not generate a decline in the relative employment of high-skill workers (Skott
2005, 2006; Sattinger 2006).
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Riley (2007) show that Anglo-Saxon economies had lower income GINIs in 1950 than either
continental European or Scandinavian economies; while the Anglo-Saxon economies got
less equal over the ensuing 50 years, the other groups became more equal. The institutional
congurations which have prevented de-compression in many countries are well explicated
by Estevez-Abe et al. (2001), and by Mares (2001). They o¤er an explanation of how what
Hall and Soskice (2001) call "coordinated market economies" came to have institutions of
redistribution which have, so far, proved robust in the face of changes in technology and
business organization. What they do not explain is why the compression did occur in the
Anglo-Saxon economies, nor why it occurred broadly across the industrial world in the
rst place.
One could argue that the post-war survival, and intensication, of wartime redistribu-
tion resulted simply from the extension in the political arena of the power of organized
labor.14 Yet many of the countries in which the compression occurred were governed by
conservative or center parties, without the support of unions; it occurred even in some
fascist states where the union role in national politics had been e¤ectively extinguished.
If our analysis in this paper is correct, the institutional changes that contributed
to the great compression were facilitated by the needs of business. The modern, mid-
twentieth century business enterprise o¤ered substantial productivity gains, but those
gains were conditional on the resolution of conicts within rms. Here it is necessary to
step back from the formal modeling of bargaining, in that such models describe equilibrium
end-states and can create the impression that such end-states are arrived at without
cost. The companies we describe, with worker power created by limited management
information and by product and information ows subject to hold-up, are sites of conict.
Institutions designed to minimize the cost of this conict did so by accommodating the
bargaining positions formed by the information structure of the rms.15 Thus, our analysis
in this paper provides an argument, rooted in relationships within the rm, for the parallel
compression of the income distribution of the United States and most of industrial world.
Unlike some of the European economies, the United States never developed the strong
interlocking institutional constraints on earnings distribution, described by Estevez-Abe et
al. (2001)). Instead, in the early post-war era of American mass production the constraints
and incentives provided by the managerial rm itself meant that only a relatively weak
set of institutional constraints was needed to e¤ect redistribution.
14The inuence of the cold war and the perception that the Soviet Union could present a viable alternative
economic system may also have played a role.
15Eichengreen and Iversen (1999) and Estevez-Abe et al. (2001) make an argument parallel to ours,
with regard to the positive relationship between catch-up potential after wartime losses (proxied by the
ratio of GDP per capita post-war and pre-war), and the formation of institutions for social insurance, skill
formation and - in the event if not the design - redistribution.
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8 Conclusion
The substantial productivity benets of a planned division of labor - benets derived
from economies of scale, scope, and speed - brought the rapid emergence of managerial
rms in the early twentieth century. The productivity gains were contingent, however,
on solving problems of coordination and control within the rms. The limitations of
the information systems employed for coordination and control created signicant agency
problems, both individual and collective, which on balance strengthened the bargaining
power of lower-ranking and less-skilled workers. Moreover, the organizational inexibility
inherent in coordinating extensive divisions of labor with crude ICT reduced top managers
scope for action, thus limiting their agency rents. These factors had the potential, in a
decentralized system of wage determination, to reduce inequality; however, they also had
the ability, amply evidenced in the 1930s, to provide a setting for industrial conict which
dissipated many of the productivity gains promised by managerial enterprise, and in some
cases might even threaten the larger social order. Under these circumstances, institutions
which aided peaceful resolution of workersclaims were socially functional. The particular
causal mechanisms by which this functionality came to be implemented is beyond the
scope of this paper.
The relationship we propose between ICT and income distribution needs to be com-
pared with a more conventional story, which connects the two through the market for skill.
There is such a market, and there is no doubt that shifts in the supply of, and demand
for, skills a¤ects the distribution of income. The questions here are whether supply of and
demand for skill provides the principal route by which changing technology explains the
great U-turn in income distribution in the US and other liberal market economies between
1940 and 2000. There are a number of reasons for doubting that the market for skill can
explain either the abruptness of the changes - particularly the onset of the compression -
or the relative stability of the distribution in other periods.
Moreover, it is clear that institutional change played a large part at both the inception
and the reversal of the great compression. If technological changes contributed to the
compression through the labor market - whether via skills or via agency - was it just a
coincidence that institutional changes were pushing the income distribution in the same
direction? We do not need to fall back on coincidence if the institutional changes are
produced endogenously by the same process that connects technology and the labor mar-
ket. We argue that the agency problem - the imperative of resolving conicting claims to
productivity gains - provides good story of endogenous institutional change at both ends
of the great compression, in a way that the skill story cannot.
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